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JURISDICTION
This

appeal is from a conviction of second-degree felony theft

in the Second District Court.
the

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

appeal under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(3)

(Supp.

1986).
Charles Edward Massey was charged with committing the crimes of
burglary#
felony/

a

second-degree

felony/

and

theft/

a

in West Point/ County of Davis/ State of Utah/ on or about

March 22nd through March 24th,

1987. After deliberation, the jury

reached a verdict of guilty of theft/
not guilty of burglary/

a second-degree felony/

a second-degree felony.

and

Defendant made a

Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Arrest of Judgment,
11/

second-degree

On

August

1987, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby denied both motions and

sentenced Charles Edward Massey to prison for one to fifteen years.

iii

Did the State produce insufficient evidence to convict Defendant
of Theft?
Did the State fail to produce enough evidence to give the State
jurisdiction of the alleged theft by Defendant?
Did the Court improperly instruct the jury and impermissibly
shift the burden of proof?

iv

oiniunjfi.1 riujv xoiuno

U.S. Constitution, Amendment V, - No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Constitution of Utah, Art. I Sec. 12 - In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal
in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
UTAH CODE ANNOT. 76-1-201 - Jurisdiction of Offenses.
(1)
A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense
which he commits, while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct,
or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly within the
state; or
(b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to
commit an offense within the state; or
(c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to
commit an offense within the state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy
occurs in the state; or
(d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the
laws of both this state and such other jurisdiction.
(2)
An offense is committed partly within this state if either the
conduct which is an element of the offense, or the result which is such an
element, occurs within this state. In homicide the "result" is either the
physical contact which causes death, or the death itself; and if the body
of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death shall be presumed
to have occurred within the state.
(3) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed
by the law of this state is committed within the state regardless of the
location of the offender at the time of the omission •

v

UTAH CODE ANNOT. 76-4-201 - Conspiracy.
A person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that
conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons
to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct and any one of them
commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy.

VI
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i

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

That there was insufficient evidence at trial to confer

jurisdiction on Defendant in Utah and to convict him of theft in Utah.
2.

The jury was improperly instructed in that they were told

that they could make a finding of guilty on a limited number of factors to
the exclusion of other factors.
3.

The factors upon which they were permitted to make a finding

of guilt impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and allowed the court
to improperly place excessive weight on Defendant's failure to take the stand.

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 24, 1987, Dennis Bingham went to 3510 West 1300 North,
West Point, Utah (R.
Norma

Thompson,

numerous

11-12) •

discovered

items taken (R.

March 22,

1987 (R.

Mr, Bingham, son-in-law of Lee and

the

house had been broken

12-14).

19).

into

The house was last secured

and
on

Both Lee and Norma testified no one had

permission to take any items that had been taken from the residence
(R.

55-69).

State

Kenneth

Police

(R.

Massey

on

March

106).

Mr.

106).

Trooper

found in Mr.

28,

1987,

in

Deschutes

Charles

County,

on

sentencing,

108,

110,

Oregon

(R.

in

111, 112, 117). The items of property

identified

either

by Mr.

Utah (R. 35-55, 65-69).
the

burglary

counsel

and guilty

for

Mr.

Massey

pursuant to Section 77-35-23 U.C.A.,
jurisdiction

Edward

Hodgson testified to several items of property

Lee

Thompson

as property they owned and had left at the

West Point,
guilty

105) testified that he stopped

Oregon

Massey*s vehicle and in his coat in Deschutes County,

were

Thompson

a patrolman for the

Massey was in a 1977 Monte Carlo registered to him (R.

the vehicle (R.

Oregon,

Wayne Hodgson,

and

also

moved

or

Norma

residence

in

The jury came back with a not
on

the

moved

theft
to

charge.

arrest

1953 as amended,

the Court to

dismiss

At

judgment

for lack of
the

charges

pursuant to Section 77-35-25 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, also for lack
of jurisdiction.

Both motions were denied by the judge.

2

POINT I
THE STATE FAILED TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO GIVE THE
TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION UNDER U.C.A. SECTION 7(>-l-201 TO
CONVICT
DEFENDANT MASSEY OF THEFT AS CHARGED
IN
THE
INFORMATION.
The
under
alleged

Utah

Criminal Code clearly sets forth

the

circumstances

which a person may be prosecuted in the State of Utah for an
criminal offense.

Section 76-1-201 Utah

Code

Annotated

1953 as amended, provides:
76-1-201. Jurisdiction of Offenses
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an
offense which he commits/ while either within or outside the
state, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is
legally accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly
within the state; or
(b) The conduct outside the stae constitutes an attempt
to commit an offense within the state; or
(c)
The
conduct outside the state constitutes
a
conspiracy to commit an offense within the state and an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or
(d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction
an offense under the laws of both this state and such other
jurisdiction.
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either
the conduct which an element of the offense, or the result
which is such an element, occurs within this state.
In
homicide the "result" is either the physical contact which
causes death, or the death itself; and if the body of a
homicide is found within the state, the death shall be
presumed to have occurred within the state.
(3)
An offense which is based on an omission to perform a
duty imposed by the law of this state is committed within the
state regardless of the location of the offender at the time
of the omission.
The jury found Mr.
Count

One

Massey not guilty of the burglary charge in

of a Two Count Information,

and convicted him

theft charge in Count Two of the Information.

3

Thus,

of

in order

the
to

convict Mr. Massey of the theft charge, the State had the burden of
showing

that

Defendant

the

Massey

alleged

theft occurred

within

Davis

herein contends that the State failed

that the alleged theft offense occurred within Davis
and

that

the

trial court therefore lacked

Masseyfs

Defendant

some

78-1-201.

to

the

It is of course,

prove

County,

jurisdiction

alleged theft fits none of

enumerated in U.C.A.

County.

Utah

because

circumstances

axiomatic

that

constituent element of the alleged offense must have occurred

within

the State in order

to

confer jurisdiction upon

the

trial

court to convict Defendant Massey of the alleged offense.
See,

1984 Utah L.

Rev. 685, 691-695.

It is not controverted that

evidence was introduced at trial that Mr.
or

had

constructive

Thompson house.
tended

possession

However/

to prove that Mr.

possession

of

Massey was in possession

of some

items

taken

from

the

all of the evidence introduced at trial
Massey possessed and/or had constructive

stolen goods in Oregon,

not

in

Utah.

There

is

absolutely no evidence to show that Mr. Massey committed a theft in
Utah

and/or

obtained or exercised unauthorized control

stolen

property while in Utah.

jury's

verdict

constituent

In fact,

of

the theft offense

the

it is arguable that the

on the burglary charge suggests that none

elements

over

charged

of

the

against

Mr.

Massey occurred within the State of Utah.
U.C.A.
under

76-1-201 sets forth three different factual situations

which the Court has the requisite jurisdiction to convict

person of theft.
U.C.A.

a

The first factual situation (Sec. 76-1-201(1)(a)

as amended) requires that the offense,

be committed wholly or partly within the State.

4

in this case theft,
While it is

true

___,

j

~**~ w«ivxiiy

occurred within the State of Utah,
of

the

charge

burglary.

from the home in West Point.
to

tine stolen

Mr. Massey was found not guilty

Massey did not take

Thus,

and/or

property

while

the

items

in order for the jury's theft

exercised unauthorized control
in

burglary
any

stand there must be some evidence that

obtained

property

The jury's not guilty verdict on the

implies a finding that Mr.

conviction

or

State of Utah.

over

A review

Mr.

Massey

the

stolen

of

the

trial

transcript indicates that there is no fact or evidence to show that
Mr.

Massey obtained and/or exercised unauthorized control over the

stolen property while in Utah.
Mr.

Massey

Utah.

At best,

the evidence showed that

had possession of the stolen property in

Thus,

it follows that Oregon,

Oregon,

not Utah had the

not

requisite

jurisdiction to convict Mr. Massey of theft.
There
satisfy

was

evidence or testimony presented

the second factual circumstance set forth in

201(1)(b).
points

no

to

at

trial

U.C.A

to

76-1-

In other words, all of the evidence presented at trial
conduct

in Oregon and not to any conduct

which

would

constitute an attempt to commit a criminal offense in Utah.
Finally,

the state failed to prove circumstances which

satisfy

the

conduct

outside

offense

within

conspiracy

third requirement under
the
the

occurs

U.C.A.

76-1-201(1)(c)

state constitute a conspiracy to
state

and

within the

an

act

state.

in

U.C.A.

would
that

commit

furtherance

of

an
the

76-4-401 (1953),

amended, defines conspiracy as follows:
"A person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that
conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or
more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such
conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance
of the conspiracy."
5

The trial transcript in the instant proceeding does not set forth any evidence
which would indicate that the Mr. Massey was guilty of conspiracy.

More

importantly, the State does not allege conspiracy in their information.

Thus

U.C.A Section 76-l-201(lXc) does not apply under the circumstances of the
instant case.
Although there is scant case law interpreting U.C.A. Section 76-1-201 the
existing cases make it abundantly clear that at least on element constituting
the offense must occur within the state in order for the court to have the
requisite jurisdiction to convict a defendant of the offense.

See for example,

State v. Simpson, 541 P. 2d 1114, 1116 (Utah, 1975). In the instant case, the
inference of the jury's not guilty verdict on the burglary charge is that Mr.
Massey did not obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the stolen property
in West Point, Utah.

Moreover, the evidence presented at trial proves only

that Mr. Massey exercised unauthorized control over the property while in
Oregon.

The trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to convict Mr, Massey

of the theft offense.

POINT H
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT
IN THE INSTANT PROCEEDING WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN A CRIMINAL CONVICTION AGAINST
APPELLANT BASED UPON THE CHARGE CONTAINED
IN THE INFORMATION.
A reviewing court has the authority to review a case on the sufficiency
of the evidence.

In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1983), this Court

stated ". . . notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision
this Court still has the right to review the suffiency of the evidence to support
the verdict."

The Utah Supreme Court then stated the standard to be applied:

6

.. ~ *wrwxoc: a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when
the evidence [viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict]
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently inprobable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted. Id.
This standard restates the Due Process requirements which prohibit a criminal
conviction in all cases except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with whidi the defendant was charged,
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 397 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
In the present case, Mr. Massey could have been found to have constructive
possession of property of the theft in Oregon.

However, nothing at trial was

offered to indicate that Mr. Massey had obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over these items at West Point, County of Davis, State of Utah on
or about the 22nd through the 24th days of March, 1987.
The probable cause statement stated that two screwdrivers were

identified

as belonging to the defendant. However at trial no evidence was introduced
that those screwdrivers belonged to Defendant on or about the time the offense
is alleged to have occurred.

(T. 1-166.)

Thus the court should have sustained

Defense counsel's motion to dismiss after the State presented their case should
have been granted as to the theft charge.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
THAT THEY COULD INFER THAT DEFENDANT
STOLE THE PROPERTY IN HIS POSSESSION IF HIS
POSSESSION WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED
Instruction

No. 14 was presented as follows :

Possession of property recently stolen, if not satisfactorily explained, is
ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the inference
and find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in
the case, that the person in possession stole the property.
7

Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt(1) that
the defendant was in possession of property, (2) that the property was stolen,
(3) that such possession was not too remote in point of time from the theft,
and (4) that no satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts and find that
the defendant stole the property.

The U.S. Constitution and the Utah State Constitution allows the defendant
the right to remain silent and the right not to be "compelled to give evidence
against himself"
I & 12.

U.S. Constitution Amendment V, UTAH CONSTITUTION ART.

The instruction as given requires the Defendant to satisfactorily explain

his possession of recently stolen property.

In this trial Defendant did not testify

so the jury wasinstructedthat they could infer that the property in his
possession was stolen because at trial he made no explanation let alone a satisfactory explantion as to why he may have possessed the property.

This infringes

upon Defendant's right to remain silent.
This case is similar to Griffin v. California 380 U.S. 609 (1965), wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court held that where the substance of an instruction that
allows

State the privilege of tendering to the jury for its consideration

the failure of the accused to testify, that reversible error occurs.
This occurred even though the jury was instructed that the defendant has
a constitutional right not to testify, (Id.)
In the instant case the court explained that his failure to satisfactorily
explain his possession of stolen property could infer his guilt which could solemnize
the silence of the accused into evidence against him. (Id).

8

-

—"» »» um-ueu ocaues, 14V U.S. 60,

11

*** The Act was framed with a due regard to those who
might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law gives
to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who can safely
venture on the witness stand, though entirely innocent of the charge against
him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to
explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against
him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase
rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, however
honest, who would therefore willingly be placed on the witness stand. The
statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes mentioned
might refuse to ask to be witnesses, particularly when they may have been
in some degree compromised by their association with others, declares that
the failure of a defendant in a criminal action to request to be a witness
shall not create any presumption against him."
In the instant case the instruction impermisslbably allowed the jury to infer
Defendant's guilt where he remained silent.
This case is distinguishable from State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah
1985), and State v. Smith-726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986), because the jury was
instructed in the instant case that this instruction allows more than an inference of guilt as in those cases but allows the jury to make a finding of guilt
based upon the enumerated facts in Instruction 14 as recited above.

The trial

court erroneously stated,based upon four elements recited in the instruction
and those four elements alone, that a juror may flinfer from those facts and
find that the defendant stole the property.ff

R. at Instruction No. 14.

9

POINT IV
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 IMPERMISSABLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF
It is beyond controversy that the burden is upon the prosecution to
prove all elements of a criminal offense.

UTAH CODE ANNOT. Section 76-

1-501 (1953 as amended) provides:
ff

A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
This standard is found in federal and constitutional law as well.
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
"Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature
of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged." In Re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970)
Utah Const, art. I Section 7 provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law."
As shown, the burden upon the State to prove every element of a criminal
offense is an essential ingredient to due process requirements and is premised
in both federal and state law.
Instruction No. 14 as enumerated in Point III is faulty for another
reason.

It is prejudicial because it states that the jury may infer and find

that the defendant stole the property he possessed merely from the elements
listed in the instruction which include four elements which do not include
all the elements necessary for a conviction of theft or all the circumstances
which should be considered in passing upon whether or not Defendant stole
the property.

10

Thus the jury was given the opportunity in instruction no. 14 to give
a directed verdict on what are the elements of theft irregardless of what
they felt about other evidence that showed that no theft took place in
Utah.

See United States v. Bosch,

505 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir. 1974).

The trial court in effect did what concerned the Utah Supreme Court
in other cases in that it erroneously addresses the issue of guilt and
relieves the state of its burden of proof.

State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d

321 (Utah 1985), State v. Pacheo, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985).

This

instruction does harm by "singling out and emphasizing particular evidence
in a cause to the exclusion of other evidence which may be of equal or
greater importance, and without further explanation or direction, may tend
to convey direction, May tend to convey to the jury that when such enumerated
particulars are shown the burden of proof is shifted to the accused, which
if not sustained by him, requires the verdict to be case against him."
State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 at 327 (Utah 1985).
This instuction follows that logic by directing the jury that they
may make a finding of guilt based solely on what is enumerated in Instruction
No. 14 to the exclusion of other evidence.

Thus the instruction constitutes

reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Appellant should have his conviction dismissed and vacated or a new
trial ordered based on the above points.
Dated this / 1 day of February, 1

David^Grindstaff
Attorney for Appellant^

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact copies of
the foregoing brief, postage prepaid, first-class mail, to Sandra Sjogren,
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, this jO^_ day of February, 1988.
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I'v.-ti County A t t o r n e y
M<<norirtl C o u r t h o u s e B u i l d i n q
Farmington, Utah 84025

.......

.. o„
- r
;.
o : . . ;-. , . i,. i

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY ^STKRjr, OF;TJT$XCLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
B a i l 20j oo <*•••"

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLEY MASSEY,
Defendant.

INFORMATION

iZilLLiiLltJ-Slt-JtfisMi

The undersigned affiant, Glenn Parker, under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant, on or about the 22nd
through and 24th days of March, 1987, at West Point, County of
Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of:
COUNT ONE
BURGLARY (76-6-202 UCA), a felony of the second degree, as
follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did
enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling or any portion of a
dwelling with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an
assault on any person.
COUNT TWO
THEFT (76-6-404 UCA), a felony of the second degree, as
follows:

That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant did

obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, said property
having a value exceeding $1,000.00.
This Information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witnesses: Glenn Parker, Dave Fluckiger, Alan Pratt,
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wxtn the Davis County Sheriff's Office and

that he bases this Information on the following:
1.

On the 24th day of March, 1987, Dennis Bingham reported

to the Davis County Sheriff's Office that he had discovered that
his mother and step-father's residence at 3510 West 1300 North,
West Point, Davis County, Utah, had been burglarized, entry having
apparently been made through a broken window in the door.

The

house had last been secured on the evening of March 22, 1987.
2.

Lee Thompson, whose residence was burglarized, provided

affiant with a list of the items stolen and their values; the total
value of all items taken was over $16,000.00.
3.

Affiant observed the scene of the burglary; two

screwdrivers were found in the house, one on a TV/VCR stand (from
which the VCR had been removed), and the other about a foot from a
filing cabinet which had been locked, but pried open during the
burglary; Shelly Powell, a daughter of a woman who lived with
Charley Massey, the defendant, later identified both screwdrivers
as belonging to the defendant.
4.

Kathleen Massey, who lives with the defendant, reported

to affiant that the defendant left on the afternoon of March 24,
1987, and she has not seen him since.

Affiant
Screened by:
Assigned to:

J. Mark Andrus
J. Mark Andrus

(*

Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that
the person in possession stole the property.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of
property, (2) that the property was stolen, (3) that such
possession was not too remote in point of time from the theft,
and (4) that no satisfactory explanation of such possession has
been given or appears from the evidence, then you may infer from
those facts and find that the defendant stole the property.
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